The Charioteer

2008 VP Debate

2008-10-06T00:46:00.000-04:00

"Bullshit" as #1 Issue in '08 Presidential Election

2008-04-22T02:39:00.002-04:00

Poll: Bullshit Is Most Important Issue For 2008 Voters

No Cussing Goes to the City Council

2008-03-06T21:35:00.003-05:00

Despite the air of pleasantry, there is something grotesque about the whole thing; something that hearkens back to the a Geneva-esque legislative moralism. Ironically, precisely at a time when psychoanalysis takes off in the contemporary world, legistlative "proclamations" of prohibition such as these perpetuate repressive behavior, which is far worse than the letting loose of a four-letter word. Indeed, is makes for good business! Here is part of the msnbc article

"California community declares itself a cuss-free zone

SOUTH PASADENA, Calif. - This tranquil community on the edge of Los Angeles has become a cursing-free zone.

Under a City Council proclamation approved Wednesday, those who use profanity or make rude gestures could find themselves shamed into better behavior by the unsettling glances of South Pasedena residents who take their reputation for civility seriously.

"That's one of the purposes of this," Mayor Michael Cacciotti said of his city's proclamation designating the first week of March as No Cussing Week. "It provides us a reminder to be more civil, to elevate the level of discourse."

Facebook: 23yr old vs. Yahoo

2007-08-24T14:04:00.000-04:00

I came across a Newsweek article on Facebook and its mastermind, Mark Zuckerberg, who at 19 created the social database that now rivals MySpace and any others. I just thought it remarkable and commendable that even early on, Mark could spit on the billion dollar offer from Yahoo. Now that is a case of sticking it to them, from the little man. Mark is not so little anymore, owning a business with some 300 employees. Yet it is still commendable that he keeps it for himself. Yahoo would have trashed it...

If you can read the article, at least read this segment:

Early investor Peter Thiel, who sits on Facebook's board, believes that a measly billion dollars for this 300-person company spread over three buildings in downtown Palo Alto, Calif., is a risible sum. Instead, he compares Facebook's current price tag to that of MTV, which he values at about seven or eight billion bucks. "Between the two, I'd want to own Facebook," he says. Not that it's for sale.

"The Power of One"

2007-08-22T12:20:00.000-04:00

SONATA ARCTICA lyrics

I will forever stand behind my claim that European progressive power metal is (with a touch of irony) some of the most intelligent music ever produced, save symphonic orchestration. I continue to be astounded by the brilliance in both the musicianship and song writing in some of the European (primarily German) brands of metal, which is far from the concept most Americans tend to have when they think of the genre of heavy metal.

Take for example Sonata Arctica's epic piece "The Power of One," off their 2001 album Silence. I have heard the song many times, but it wasn't until I found this video that put the song with clips from Schindler's List that it occurred to me to read the song's lyrics. In fact, the song is an entire philosophy against domination, slavery, and mastership -- racial, national, or any other kind. This idea of the "one," and its particular power, expresses, as Tony Kakko writes, that "we are all the same." Though this idea has a limit in how far it should be extended, for Kakko, it is accurate and suitable for emphasis at least when dealing with the situation of domination. There must be a degree where we are all the same in order to combat attempts for a race or nation to place themselves above any other race or nation. Kakko writes:

"In the world that we live on, the lies said and done
They can well overrun
the power of one."

There is another interesting theme in the song, that of blindness. The song indicates blindness as a blessing, indeed, "the hope of mankind." It is a bit strange since usually it is blindness that gets the blame for the atrocities of history. Here, though, I think it is a interesting epistemological point of how one might think they can see unblemished the way things are and fool themselves into further thinking they are superior to others. It is a question of being aware of our blindness that is the hope of mankind.

I always wondered about the line after, "no one was born to be a servant or a slave," namely, "who can tell me the color of the rain." This is an astounding physical example of how were are inept in describing the color of the rain (or water in general) which indicates blindness most of all.

In the beginning there is this line:
"I saw the colors too bright, not knowing that I was blind."

Finally at the end, there is a switch:
"I need to believe.
There's more than the eye can see
All colors of rainbow."

Gilson on "The Breakdown of Modern Philosophy"

2007-07-20T10:24:00.000-04:00

I happened to find a cheap copy of Etienne's The Unity of Philosophical Experience in a bookstore yesterday and was browsing through at work. The work is a historical survey of philosophy comparing and contrasting the "Medieval Experiment" with the Cartesian and Modern "Experiments." In a chapter entitled "The Breakdown of Modern Philosophy," the famous existential Thomist writes the following passage about which I couldn't help but be both amused and astounded; and given my sympathies with the philosophy of Scheler, it is easy to see why:

...the second fundamental feature of Western culture, is a definite conviction that reason in the specific difference of man. Man is best described as a rational animal; deprive man of reason and what is left if not man, but animal. This looks like a very common place statement, yet Western culture is dying wherever it has been forgotten; for the rational nature of man is the only conceivable foundation for a rational system of ethics.

Now, I realize the work was written back in 1935, but Scheler and many others had written far deeper and penetrating insights into the "difference" of man, earlier than this, than Gilson's simplification of the question under the blanket of reason. It's precisely the line, "Western culture is dying wherever it has been forgotten," that is most amusing. Prof. Gilson, there is much, I grant, that has been forgotten in the modern era in philosophy which would have served them well to retain and preserve from the medieval experiment, but among those things which were lost was certainly not emphasis on reason nor a rational system of ethics. The Enlightenment secured more for the West love of reason than the medieval experiment had, and Kant's system of ethics could not be considered anything but rational. So if the deterioration of rationality is a mark of the decline of Western culture, I think we must judge the West, in the modern period, as precisely a period of growth.

Yet, I tend to agree with Gilson's judgment of history and, generally speaking, Spengler's Decline of the West, yet I vehemently disagree with the inclusion of the status of rationality as a important factor. In fact, I think it proves something precisely against Gilson's argument. For if the West is in fact declining, the fact that King Reason has not shows the it could very well be that an extreme emphasis on reason (an emphasis the medievals never wished to put above faith, for example) could precisely be that which is contributing to the decline.

Perhaps an ethic of reason is not as important as a ethic of love. Perhaps Scheler is right....

Scheler's Anthropology and the Telos of Modernity

2007-06-01T15:58:00.000-04:00

How depressing it would be to progress through life and have nothing to look forward to. I was thinking this at work the other day, and the thought was prompted by the life of a co-worker of mine. He was telling me how he works the security bit from 7a-3p, but comes to the PNC building for this shift after a full overnight shift at Allegheny General. He goes home from the PNC building, grabs a bite to eat, and heads to bed only to do the same thing the following day. I thought to myself, "and for what?" Whether this person's life, outside of his 16hr a day work routine, is meaningless is not the question and should not be judged rashly.

The question this discussion sparked was, what is the drive that would compel someone -- anyone -- to live such a life where the major concern is simply making money? What is the telos, the goal, behind it all? There could certainly be noble reasons one would have to work such an amount of hours. However, most people, unfortunately, probably work those hours in order to increase their expendable income. And I do not consider a noble goal the desire to buy one more thing that one might want. Is this the telos of the modern mind? Is this the drive that propels one to fill 2/3 of their day working so they can either purchase something not yet owned, or pay off something already bought? Is this the highest and mightiest toward which we can look forward to, and hope for: only more stuff?

Whatever happened to the ancient perspective of fulfilling our nature in actualizing our potentiality by means of virtue; or the medieval interpretation of this from a religious perspective whereby to become more fully human is actually to become like the divine? These former ages noticed something behind all the work: an ultimate noble goal -- a worthy ultimate.

I thought back to these things today, when, in reading Scheler's essay On the Idea of Man (1915), I noticed he has some relevant thoughts. Scheler sees the danger in describing man as a "rational animal" or "homo faber" as not recognizing that for which these things aim. In other words, it is precisely through this activity of intellect and of work that man becomes who he is, i.e., man becomes

that being which can transcend all life and can transcend himself. 'Man'...is the intention and gesture of 'transcendence' itself. ... And he is able to be this, and is just able to be this, to the extent that his intellect, his tools and his machines give him more free leisure time for the contemplation and the love of God. This alone is that which justifies his intellect and his work -- civilization. Intellect and tool allows his essence to be more and more permeated by spirit and love, which in all his movements and acts...have the tendency toward something called 'God.' ...the root of all culture is the x toward which prayer and the movement of a holy love has its direction: God.

But is Scheler correct since it seems to be so far from what seems to be the telos or drive of modern culture? I will simply say this, taking from the last line of the passage: the root of our culture is the x toward which prayer and the movement of love has it's direction: the consumption of "goods."

The Secret, or a Philosophy-less Philosophy

2007-05-13T23:50:00.000-04:00

It astounds me how hundreds of books are published each year by learned and erudite minds that, even if they are not necessarily groundbreaking in material, are still miles superior to the slavish drivel of Rhonda Byrne's bestseller, The Secret. So why does the drivel have the upperhand on the great oration? Perhaps, ironically, it is precisely because the book is so poorly argued, and therefore, very simple, that the masses take to it all the more; because it is a "philosophy" without a grounding philosophy, and therefore is easier to understand than philosophical scholarship. But this is all the more dangerous. If the only philosophically oriented literature the majority of people read nowadays is that "philosophical" literature that is not actually rigorously supported by philosophical argumentation, but some random references to "great thinkers" and actual quotes by others who happen not to be great thinkers, then philosophy (or a legitimate and supported world-view) is not what is actually being received. Rather, Rhonda's random, unsupported world-view, born from a reflection on experience, but one who certainly has not won the the educational rights to write philosophy. In short: why would someone trust a purported world-view, without the philosophical support of education and knowledge of previous philosophies?

Take for example the first paragraph of the dustcover summary:

Fragments of a Great Secret have been found in oral traditions, in literature, in religions and philosophies throughout the centuries. For the first time all the pieces of The Secret come together in an incredible revelation that will be life-transforming for all who experience it.

No one writing a serious philosophy or scholarly work would get away with a statement such as this one. (1) It's overly sensational. (2) It's incredibly audacious in its claim to tradition and its superiority. (3) It's far too presumptuous in terms of its expected outcome. In fact, there are scholars who dedicate their lives to the study of these very traditions, oral, literary, religious and philosophical traditions who all just may very much call Rhonda's work into question.

Read books with some scholarly argumentation and not empty assertions even if the latter are easier to understand. And don't trust any random philosophy, and especially if the author has not achieved the right to convince you of her opinion, i.e., who is not even a philosopher. In short, dump The Secret in the trash can nearest you!

Did Scheler Foreshadow Levinas' Critique of Heidegger?

2007-05-02T23:36:00.000-04:00

Scheler once wrote that "if I were Dasein, I would rather not exist." Is this not essentially what Levinas is disputing by razing down ontology and attempting to reverse the Heideggerian poles of its relation to metaphysics. It is because Being is essential empty and impersonal, devoid of content, such as the sight of the face. Being's fundamentality is precisely its fault, and because of this, lacks the very fundamentality it claims. The analytic of Dasein is simply an impersonal form of Being. So are we to give up personality for totality? What is the point? Who cares enough about totality? Why would it be so important to remain on such an impersonal level?

Of course, Levinas finds this meaningless. As did Scheler, quite boldly, over twenty years before Levinas. Scheler's claim to fame is the destruction of the formal through the material, the ascendancy of the personal over everything impersonal. Why has this not been noticed?

Scheler will continue to lack a place in philosophy if his importance is never noticed. More on this later.... Much more indeed.

Paper Presentation for the International Graduate Conference, Essex

2007-03-23T14:37:00.000-04:00

I was pleased to learn that a paper I wrote on the question of human finitude in Hegel and Paul Ricoeur was accepted for presentation at University of Essex's 10th International Graduate Conference. The title of the conference is "G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: After 200 Years." The keynotes are Dr. Karin de Boer from Groningen, presenting "Hegel's Antigone and Tragedy of Cultural Difference." As well as the University's own, Dr. Wayne Martin, who will be presenting on "Hegel's Failed Confessional Enterprise." I will therefore be traveling to England (actually returning!) at the end of April to participate in this one day conference.

Official conference literature has just been posted recently. A colleague of mine at Duquesne, Jim Bahoh, was also accepted, which certainly puts the Duquesne philosophy program in good light for those attending.

I put online the original copy of my paper. The one being presented will be a revised version of this one. I will put that revised copy up when it is completed.

Charles Taylor, Winner of the 2007 Templeton Award

2007-03-14T22:37:00.000-04:00

The prestige of the award notwithstanding, there is a compelling interview with Taylor entitled: "What Role Does Spiritual Thinking Have in the 21st Century."

Should be good!

Alasdair McIntyre's Books on Edith Stein

2007-03-05T23:04:00.000-05:00

The renowned contemporary ethicist, most known for his work in communitarian virtue ethics, has supposedly devoted the remainder of his career to the lesser known student of Husserl and Catholic phenomenologist, Edith Stein (aka, Sister Benedicta Croce). Even the titles of his first two books, Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue (Dec. 2005), and Edith Stein: The Philosophical Background (Aug. 2006), indicate an anticipated lengthy project, for they more resemble chapter titles than those of entire book-length studies. Might an awakening of Stein be in the "works"? If it will ever happen, most assuredly, it will happen under the auspices of a name like MacIntyre's.

Maine de Biran (1766-1824)

2007-03-01T12:13:00.000-05:00

I came across the name of this French Modern philosopher somewhat by accident, when, in doing research, it suddenly popped up in more than one place and in the most random and unconnected settings; nothing of substance was ever said of him, only his name mentioned to draw a connection to some thought. So I did some more research. It turns out, despite his obscurity and hiddeness in the philosophical shadows, the legacy applied to him is quite staggering.

I first came across his name in reading Scheler. In his essay "Idealism and Realism" Scheler writes: "The most penetrating and rigorous development of...the idea that reality is not given to us in perceptual acts, but in our instinctive and conative conduct vis-a-vis the world..., and the one which, at the same time, seems to come closer to the truth than anything else written on the subject--closer even than Dilthey [Scotus, Berkeley, and Schelling]--is that of the Frenchman Maine de Biran" (Selected Philosophical Essays, 318). Yet Scheler leaves it at that, pursuing it no further, and instead goes into detail on Schelling and Dilthey!

The second most striking place Biran name came up is in Mounier's book, Personalism. Mounier writes that Biran "is the latest of the fore-runners to French personalim. He denounces the mechanical mentality of the ideologues, who resolve all concrete existence into the psuedo 'elements' of thought, and he looks for the self in the propulsive effort by which man acts upon the world. ... Maine de Biran's thinking is a remarkable elucidation of the roots of personality and of its sphere of expansion" (Personalism, xxiv). This passage is in Mounier's introduction; Biran's thought is pursued no further!

The third setting is the most accidental: In Scheler's essay "Love and Knowledge," he attributes the phrase "volo, ergo sum," to Augustine. I know in the City of God is Augustine's famous "Si fallor, sum," but "volo, ergo sum"? So I did a Google search of the phrase to see what came up. In the few pages that hit, I found that the phrase is mostly attributed to the Islamic philosopher Al Gazzali (maybe some kind of westernization there, for why would a Muslim write in Latin?) However, there was one site, with a copy of Alexander Gunn's book Modern French Philosophy, which was written initially as a dissertation under the direction of Henri Bergson! This is significant, because I have also noticed that Biran's name would, more times than not, be in connection with Bergson. Supposedly Bergson was really interested in Biran, which would explain the connection to Scheler.

Here is a passage from Gunn's book on de Biran:

It is the special merit of De Biran that he endeavoured, and that successfully, to establish both the concreteness and the essential spirituality of the inner life. The attitude and method which he adopted became a force in freeing psychology, and indeed philosophy in general, from mere play with abstractions. His doctrines proved valuable, too, in establishing the reality and irreducibility of the mental or spiritual nature of man.

Maine de Biran took as his starting-point a psychological fact, the reality of conscious effort. The self is active rather than speculative; the self is action or effort-- that is to say, the self is, fundamentally and primarily, will. For the Cartesian formula 'Cogito, ergo sum,' De Biran proposed to substitute that of 'Volo, ergo sum.'

I must conclude with my recent findings. Two books that I'm very eager to dive into (and now that it is my break, I can) are 1) Merleau-Ponty actually wrote a book partly on Biran, The Incarnate Subject: Malebranche, Biran, and Bergson on the Union of Body and Soul.

2) Michel Henry's book entitled Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body. The first chapter is "The Philosophical Presuppositions of the Biranian Analysis of the Body."

Biran and I just may get along.

What is Catholic Philosophy?

2007-02-22T14:35:00.000-05:00

Ironically, I'm thinking about this question of Catholic philosophy more now, at Duquesne, than I ever did at Franciscan. But this is not ironic, in the sense that, at Franciscan, this attempt to build its program on the foundations of a "Catholic philosophy" was my only philosophical exposure. Retrospectively, I can see how my education there was truly formative. But like all good education, I suppose, I came away questioning its very foundation and approach. But, one can say, Franciscan isn't the perfect embodiment of what Catholic philosophy is, so surely it is prone to error. Well, I would respond, this is true, but isn't the converse of your statement precisely the danger of a Catholic philosophy? That is to say, isn't the attitude that since Catholic's philosophize given the light of faith and, perhaps to a less extent, the truth of Revelation, that we have reached a so-called, "one true philosophy," (a phrase I have certainly heard tossed around at Franciscan) in which case, we are no longer prone to coming to false conclusions. Indeed, the very organization of the curriculum at Franciscan--even in philosophy--is set up so students will not primarily be trained in the rigorous strictures of professional philosophy and the dominant philosophical trends therein, nor are they even necessarily taught to think for themselves about philosophical matters, but, the dominant approach seems to give the students--"the truth."

But, to take a line from the movie "The Forgotten": "The truth can't fit in your brain!" Or, from "A Few Good Men": "You can't handle the truth."

Therefore, in matters of philosophy, I will have to say, along with Pontius Pilate: "What is truth?" I say this not to create scandal, for I know very well that the Truth is Christ! But to know that the truth is Christ, and to know what that "truth" is are two very different things. Indeed, St. Basil says "Anyone who thinks they know God [and correlatively, Truth] has a demented spirit!"

So, the question I am proposing for the meaning of Catholic philosophy is: what bearing does the infinite expansiveness of truth, coupled with our finite capacity for truth, have on philosophy? There is much we can say about what this means, but at its basic level, it at least means we cannot claim such a thing as a "one true philosophy," which, of course, to Catholics would be a "Catholic philosophy."

Neither am I suggesting relativism, for I think there is such a thing as "Truth," with a capital 'T,' but the question is whether we can adequately know this Truth. Individually, I will say certainly not. Collectively and historically, I think we have gained (and are gaining) ground to this question. But this ground have been fomented precisely by not breaking our solidarity with the modern world, or in this case, with the broad philosophical community, by claiming for ourselves as Catholics to have ultimate philosophical truth, and all else are in error.

In the Chapter "What is Catholic Philosophy," in Swidal and Gensler's "Anthology of Catholic Philosophy," Three ways to define it are proposed: (1) "philosophy based on the premises of the Catholic faith," but, so understood, would seem to be self-contradictory since philosophy is "a rational investigation that doesn't appeal to religious faith." (2) Catholics who philosophize. (3) Thomism.

My answer would be to rank them, in this order: Primarily, Catholic philosophy means "Catholics who philosophize." This stems from my discussion above, in that, philosophy should be less about proclaiming an ultimate philosophical truth, and more about training catholics to think about questions of ultimate reality, by which they can then contribute to the philosophical discussion on a very personal level. Secondly, philosophy based on Catholic faith. This implies a definition of faith, though. Catholicism is not only a set of ideas to be passed on, but it is first and foremost, a religion to be lived (granted, in accordance with the contents of Revelation). But this can influence philosophy not only in one ultimate way, but in a plurality of ways--in very individual ways. It means, rather, how does my relationship with God (the one which Catholicism believes to be the True God) influence my thoughts about reality. What is normative here is THAT religion is to influence ones philosophy, but how this looks is not conclusive. Third, It is not conclusive because Catholic philosophy can in no way be reduced to how only one person's faith has influenced his own philosophy, namely, Thomas Aquinas. We know of a man, nay, a Saint, whose faith greatly influenced his thought, and he wrote so comprehensively and powerfully on all aspects of reality, that his faith-influenced philosophy has become normative. But I find this disordered, not because Aquinas was wrong. Indeed, he for his time was truly inspired. But the call of Aquinas I think is not to think what he thought, but to do what he did, that is, to philosophize according to your Catholic faith, colored in it own way by your own spirituality, your own relationship with the living God. How this philosophy will look will not be Thomistic, but it will be your own, faith-influenced philosophy! And this is the brillant part!! That the philosophy of a lay Catholic, Franciscan University student, living in America, in the 21st Century, should look much different from a Medieval Parisian Dominican!!

This is why I think Thomists today are not true Thomists: because they only think what he thought, and do not do what he did. But what did Aquinas do? He took Aristotle, a pagan philosopher, one not at all within the Catholic philosophical tradition, and he turned him into a friend of Catholicism--who is now perhaps even more a friend than Plato. That Aristotle is a friend of the Church would have been unheard in the early Church and the early medieval Church. Thus, Thomas was not traditional! He was not confined to the tradition, but he broke its bounds--he rewrote tradition! He started a new tradition! The analogy of our time would be to do the same thing with any of the "intellectual enemies" so ostracized and dismissed by our neo-Thomistic tradition today.

Thus Catholic philosophy is not a set of doctrine to learn, subsume, and pass on--it is a journey and a call to boldly philosophize, in your own way, as a follower of Christ and his religion!

Break the mold, and call philosophy your own! "Sapere aude!"

Intentenality in Early German Phenomenology

2007-01-31T18:38:00.000-05:00

Richard Rorty, in one of his essays on Heidegger, viz., "Heidegger, contingency, and pragmatism," quotes a passage from Mark Okrent's book, Heidegger's Pragmatism that sparked my attention:

Husserl conceives of the fundamental form of intentionality as cognitive; Heidegger conceives of it as practical. As a result, Husserl thinks of the horizons in which beings are placed before us for our intuitive apprehension, whereas Heidegger thinks these horizons as fields of activity.

A comparison between Husserl and Heidegger is not as interesting to me as noticing how their phenomenological contemporary, Max Scheler, factors in. For his fundamental form of intentionality is not primarily cognitive nor practical, but rather, affective.

This may not mean much to the Husserlian nor the Heideggerian, but to the Schelerian, this is quite significant, primarily because of a simple point of Scheler's anthropology: "Man, before he is an ens cogitans [in this case, Husserl] or an ens volens [here, Heidegger], is an ens amans"(Selected Philosophical Essays, "Ordo Amoris," p. 110-11). Now, even if Scheler is right here, which I think he is, this fact alone does not guarantee Scheler's notion of intentionality all the more encapsulating, although it certainly raises the question. What would guarantee Scheler's affective notion of intentionality prime of place is if it can demonstrated to be more fundamental to, and encapsulating of, Husserl's and Heidegger's notions, as a correlative to Scheler's anthropology. If this can be demonstrated, it would serve also as a support of precisely this anthropological aspect.

I will certainly not attempt to spell all of this out in a blog post, which could be the topic of a long paper, but I will attempt to give hints here on how this can be done.

Concerning Husserl. He is always in the back of Scheler's mind, and no doubt is the source of much of Scheler's phenomenology. However, Husserl intellectual focus is certainly under Scheler's suspicious gaze. To narrow intentionality only to the cognitive realm would call Scheler's whole philosophy into question. Rather, I think that Husserl, too, could benefit greatly from a concept of intentionality in the realm of emotion. And I am thinking mostly of Husserl's Analyses of Passive and Active Synthesis (his lectures on transcendental logic) which attempt to uncover just why it is we choose one thing rather than another. This, I argue, cannot be done on the level of a theory of cognition, for logic only deals with neutrality.

Heidegger has much to learn from Scheler, and in fact already has. But he certainly did not take Scheler far enough into his philosophy. The only thing that comes close to what Scheler means by spiritual feeling is what Heidegger refers to as "mood" or "attestation." But these fail simply because if there is one part of our consciousness which is not intentional, I would certainly say mood. The cause of mood is always mediately there, and not immediately. That is, we always have to think back in past experiences or events as to why I feel some way; furthermore, mood seems to be much more of a "state" than an act. Whereas, Scheler's intentional feelings are "spontaneous acts" which are never "in something" or "about something," but loving and hating something!

2007-01-20T12:50:00.000-05:00

10th International Graduate Conference in Philosophy
University of Essex, 28th April 2007
"Two Hundred Years of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit"

Few texts in the history of European philosophy have been as provocative – or divisive – as the Phenomenology of Spirit, and few philosophers as influential as Hegel. The Phenomenology introduced a new method in philosophy; working through the analysis of shapes of human consciousness, the disclosure of their logical structures and immanent tensions, the description of their disintegration and their subsequent reconstruction. With the Phenomenology, history entered into philosophical reflection in an entirely new way. Hegel has been productively interpreted by thinkers from a diverse range of traditions. These appropriations – idealist, materialist, existentialist, socialist, political, economic – have remained immensely influential for social, ethical and political thought.

Now, 200 years after it was first published, how should we understand its legacy as an object of fascination, bewilderment and inspiration? The aim of this conference is not primarily to explore the structure, method, and content of this inexhaustible text. Rather, we invite papers which address the way in which the Phenomenology of Spirit has functioned as an inspiration, an example, and perhaps a warning for later thinkers. We are equally interested in papers which deal with topics from the fields of enquiry opened up by Hegel. We are particularly keen to receive proposals for papers on:

Philosophy’s relation to its own history

Recognition as an ethical and political category

Modernity and the problem of ‘Diremption’ (Entzweiung)

Religion and Enlightenment

Skepticism and Philosophical Knowledge

Marxist appropriations of Hegel

Critique of Transcendental Philosophy

The Department is able to provide those giving papers with limited financial assistance for travel and accommodation, but we encourage you to ask for travel grants from other bodies, e.g. home institutions. Papers should be suitable for a 30 minute presentation. Abstracts of 500 words should be sent in triplicate by 31st January, 2007 to:

Graduate Conference
Department of Philosophy
University of Essex
Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
UNITED KINGDOM
email queries: pygradc@essex.ac.uk

http://www.essex.ac.uk/philosophy/department/10th_Grad_Conf_cfp.pdf

New Link: 'The Husserl Circle'

2007-01-11T11:45:00.000-05:00

I just updated my links of philosophical societies by including "The Husserl Circle." A list just wouldn't be complete without the society of "the master" (to some). Note, however, that the 37th Annual Husserl Circle meeting will take place in Prague at the end of April. Here is a blurb from the site:

Convenor's Letter,
October 6, 2006

"I am pleased to announce that 37th Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle will take place in Prague, from Monday, 22nd through Saturday, 28th April 2007.
Should you wish to participate in the meeting by delivering a paper, the deadline for submissions is January 1, 2007. Papers should have a reading time of no more than 30 minutes (3000 words). Anyone wishing to submit a paper should send it (or a substantial abstract) directly to me (either by email attachment, airmail or fax) so that it is received by the deadline. Happily, the number of submitted papers has been growing with each meeting, but that also means that decisions may have to be made about which papers to include. Decisions will be announced by February 1, 2007.
As you probably know, the meeting is held in Prague to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth, and the 30th anniversary of the death, of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka (June 1, 1907 – March 13, 1977). Parallel with the meeting of Husserl Circle, there will be an international conference the aim of which is to see to what extent the philosophical thinking of Jan Patočka is still alive and to gauge the scope of its influence on contemporary philosophy. Scholars who are interested in Patočka and acquainted with his work have been invited to come to Prague and present their views on the importance of his philosophy.
The whole event is being jointly organised by the Center for Theoretical Study and the Center for Phenomenological Research (both at Charles University and the Institute for Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic), the Husserl Circle, the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna (IWM), and the Husserl Archive at the Ecole Normale Superieur in Paris. It will be held under the auspices of Prof. MUDr. Vaclav Hampl, C.Sc., Rector of Charles University and Prof. RNDr. Vaclav Paces, Dr.Sc., President of Czech Academy of Sciences.
The event shall consist of two parallel sections. One will be devoted exclusively to the work of Jan Patočka, with lectures held in English, French, or German. The other section will be the regular Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle. Colleagues can freely switch between sections according to their concrete interest, as the lectures will be held in adjacent rooms in Carolinum, the main building of Charles University (http://www.cuni.cz/), in the center of Old Town of Prague.

The logistic details concerning lodging and traveling shall be handled by a separate letter.

I look forward to seeing you in Prague in April 2007.

Sincerely,

Ivan Chvatík, Convenor
37th Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle"

Mailing Address:
Center for Theoretical Study
Jilska 1
100 00 Praha 1
Czech Republic
E-mail address: chvatik@cts.cuni.cz
Telephone: +420 221 416 927
Mobile phone: +420 608 849 585
Fax: +420 222 220 653

"Criticizing Consciousness: The Question of the Finite Subject in Hegel and Ricoeur"

2006-12-21T12:47:00.000-05:00

[This is the beginning of the paper I wrote this semester for Tom Rockmore's course, "Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit." There are tentative plans to submit the paper for the 2nd Annual North American Society for Philosophical Hermeneutics conference at Villanova University, Philly, Sept. 2007. View the entire article.]

§I. Introduction

Hegel was not, strictly speaking, a hermeneutic thinker;[1] Nevertheless, it has been proposed that a resemblance can be detected between some fundamental Hegelian themes and those of the hermeneutic tradition in philosophy. The most familiar of these is how Hegel departs from Kant’s and Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, and manages to ground the subject in a temporally and historically structured framework. Perhaps, then, Hegel is to Kant, within the context of nineteenth century idealism, what Heidegger will later be to Husserl’s transcendental turn, in twentieth century phenomenology. And it is precisely upon Heidegger’s Being and Time whereby hermeneutics takes a phenomenological and ontological turn, and also whereby some phenomenologists take a hermeneutic turn. Paul Ricoeur, who I will here place in dialogue with Hegel, is the most important hermeneutic phenomenologist to delineate the anthropological or ontological implications of hermeneutics by his quest to break down the primacy of the subject and render it radically finite.

Perhaps, then, there is this ontological similarity between Hegel and the hermeneutic approach, which necessarily gives to the subject its essential characteristic as finite. However, the concept of finitude is just as much an epistemological claim as it is an ontological one, and it is precisely on the level of epistemology, I think, where Hegel and Ricoeur diverge. Hegel, on the one hand, cannot base a theory of knowledge in consciousness, and so must do so only within self-consciousness; thus, “It is true that consciousness of an ‘other’, of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-itself….”[2]

Ricoeur, on the other hand, takes an opposite, approach. Placing himself deeply within the phenomenological tradition and utilizing Husserl’s concept of intentionality, Ricoeur emphasizes instead how the very “meaning of consciousness lies outside of itself”[3] and is therefore not simply reflexive. He writes, “…no consciousness is self-consciousness before being consciousness of something towards which it surpasses itself.”[4] The dichotomy here rests on the double problematic of intentionality and the primacy of self-consciousness, namely, whether self-consciousness is always already there, before consciousness, to the extent of negating intentionality, or whether self-consciousness is found precisely in our intentional relationship with the world. The further, and more important question, then is how might these epistemological differences between Hegel and Ricoeur determine their respective conceptions of the subject as finite.

I do not propose a complete and impassable distanciation between Hegel and Ricoeur, for the two cohabitate in many similar themes. However, I am concerned here primarily with their divergence. Both attempt to criticize consciousness, but ultimately, I think, in very different ways. So, may paper will proceed as follows: I will first explore the claim that Hegel’s subject is essentially a finite one, and will then offer a theory of my own concerning this claim through an interpretation of Hegel’s discussion of consciousness. Secondly, I will compare how Hegel’s conception of consciousness compares with Ricoeur’s, especially with respect to the notion of intentionality. And third, I will conclude in noticing how their different theories of consciousness culminate in one (Hegel) abandoning the notion of the finite subject, due to his primacy of self-consciousness, and the other (Ricoeur) remaining at the level of finitude through his development of a “hermeneutics of the self.”

[1] Tom Rockmore, “Hegel and the Hermeneutics of German Idealism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1995): 111-31. Particularly the line, “Hegel never explicitly reflected on problems of interpretation.”

[2] G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §164.

[3] Paul Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 112.

[4] Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” 115.

Interesting Photograph

2006-12-12T15:45:00.000-05:00

I just now came across an incredible photograph while finishing up my last post, on von Hildebrand; so to remain in the spirit of the moment, I just had to put it up as well.

As you can see, this is a picture of Märit Furtwängler and Max Scheler (on the left) and Margarete Denck and Dietrich von Hildebrand (on the right). Dietrich here is only twenty years old, which would make Scheler around 33. Now, Märit (who is pictured here with Scheler) and Dietrich were actually engaged at an earlier stage in their life. The engagement was broken, and Scheler then came to meet Märit through Dietrich, and the two later married. Even after Scheler's divorce with Märit, in 1926 I think, she never remarried because of her love for Scheler. It is said that while Scheler was dying, it was Märit he called to his bedside before seeing Maria, his new wife at the time. Even on his deathbed, Scheler asked Märit to write down some thoughts or new insights he had at the time. But they never got out; Scheler was doing philosophy up until the last moments of his life.

Its simply incredible there exists a photograph with all four in it, that I have not yet seen.

See directly below for my previous post on von Hildebrand.

Von Hildebrand's The Heart, Newly Published

2006-12-12T14:55:00.000-05:00

Just out from St. Augustine Press (Oct. 30) is the a new edition of Dietrich von Hildebrand's book The Heart: An Analysis of Human and Divine Affectivity. The new edition is edited by a past professor of mine, John F. Crosby (Franciscan University) who could very well be one of the only philosophers in America advancing new scholarship on von Hildebrand's work. I know Crosby is now also working on a translation of Dietrich's work on love.

Despite the fact that, since his conversion to Catholicism through the inspiration of Max Scheler, von Hildebrand became more of an obscure figure in mainstream German phenomenology, it is clear he has been a great influence on the part of bringing the fruits of phenomenology to the life of the Church and, to a lesser extent, her doctrine. Pius XII's statement of Dietrich as a "twentieth century Doctor of the Church," is certainly a testament to how his penetrating phenomenological analyses are not to be held in opposition to the Church's entrenched Thomistic tradition, but as complementary. Another testament to this, of course, is Franciscan University itself, which is one of the only philosophy departments in the country, which is strongly rooted in the Catholic tradition (I'm thinking also of University of Dallas, and perhaps, though to a lesser extent, Ave Maria with Fedoryka), and whose faculty have more of a phenomenological representation than a Thomistic one; and whose graduate program (this is unique to Franciscan) is modeled according to "realist phenomenology," explicitly. This type of phenomenological realism is precisely what the work von Hildebrand promotes.

Alice von Hildebrand's biography of her husband, The Soul of a Lion, is excellent exploration of Dietrich's truly fascinating life and his philosophical and spiritual journey. However, I must say, as a Schelerian, that many of the sections concerning Dietrich's relationship with Max, and especially what the book brings out about Scheler's life, is not to be wholly trusted as accurate, for a number of reasons. Nevertheless, read it.

The Phenomenology of John Paul II: Conference Review

2006-12-02T22:38:00.000-05:00

During the past two days, Duquesne University hosted a conference on the phenomenology of Pope John Paul II. I would certainly judge the conference as a whole to have been very well executed with a outstanding turnout (some 400 registered), with presenters from a wide variety of universities across America and a couple from Europe (Leuven and the International Theological Institute in Austria), and of course three impressive keynotes: George Weigel, Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., and Jean Bethke Elshtain. It certainly is encouraging to see John Paul's philosophy to be more of a force in the philosophical community in America than I would have initially expected.

However, the content of many of the papers I heard certainly didn't surprise me. With the particular focus of the conference on John Paul's phenomenology, his phenomenological strain certainly was well represented, but nevertheless, still accurately portrayed, i.e., always balanced with his ultimate philosophical foundation in Thomistic metaphysical realism. This certainly is key for Wojtyla in his philosophy, which arguably may have in some ways hindered him from adopting the full fruits of phenomenology, but is always important to keep in mind.

Wojtyla's phenomenology, it is well known, began with his Habilitationshrifft (second doctoral dissertation) on Max Scheler. Now, I certainly am interested in John Paul's philosophy in itself, but this relation between Wojtyla and Scheler (if anyone knows my philosophical interests) was of particular interest to me throughout the course of the conference. There was a presentation on the criticisms of Scheler Wojtyla lays out in his Habilitation, which was certainly helpful; as well as a panel discussion the following morning precisely aimed toward addressing this relation. Now, my sympathies on the issue, it is true, lie with Scheler. This of course, was not the opinion of most of the presenters, nor, most likely, with the majority of the conference attendees who probably have never read any of the Scheler's work, and who are probably only familiar with the Pope's criticism. This is understandable (though it may not be ideal). It is one thing, however, that attitude to exist amongst the attendees, but it seems less tolerable when it exists among the scholars. And perhaps it doesn't necessarily exist--perhaps these scholars have carefully weighed the arguments and made a careful philosophical judgment on the issues that apply. The impression, however, I get is that when dealing with the philosophy of a previous Pope, some issues are not weighed appropriately, specifically among catholic scholars, because there seems to be this unconscious (maybe even conscious) tendency to always be in favor of the Pope. For, of course, "the man is infallible!" "It would be heresy to do otherwise. " Now, these tendencies--if they exist--are absurd, for these essentially philosophical writings do not deal with dogmatic issues. And quite frankly, if these tendencies do exist, I do not think Wojtyla himself would approve of our possibly preferring his philosophy over other positions due to matters of faith, and not reason, strictly speaking.

But that's if these tendencies and tensions exist. Far be it from me to claim them so. But this Scheler-Wojtyla debate is an interesting one because some people are more or less sympathetic and seem to adopt a stance in relation to Scheler based on just how much Wojtyla himself adopted Scheler. So it seems that among catholic thinkers, the debate on how positively we are to look on Scheler comes down to the debate on how positively did Wojtyla look upon Scheler. Again, if you know anything of my philosophical interests, I look upon Scheler far more positively than Wojtyla in fact did, and am not fearful to claim my views on how Wojtyla has misread Scheler.

Josh Miller (Duquesne), one of the presenters of the panel discussion mentioned above, holds similarly as I, but perhaps not to the same degree. I highly applaud his presentation for the courage to actually mention how he thought Wojtyla was wrong on one of the issues I do--and yet so diplomatically, and carefully, and, I might add, convincingly! But I'm partial, and one of the perhaps the very few, if any, that didn't need convincing.

I am currently working on the third revision of my paper on my defense of Scheler against Wojtyla's critique and plan to present it for the ACPA (American Catholic Philosophical Association) conference next October in Milwaukee.

Nevertheless, John Paul was an excellent philosopher and scholar who had the amazing personality to love in all he did. His tender and careful dealing with even thinkers so often dismissed as "enemies," such as Kant, is surely an inspiration for philosophers, as well as how he always maintained an eye on Christ in his work.
In Memoriam. Thank you Pope John Paul II.

Excellence in German Film

2006-11-19T01:32:00.000-05:00

Who ever said Germans couldn't make movies? Granted, German films are not all that common, the film, Run Lola Run (1998), directed by Tom Tykwer, is an excellent film that gives Germans a name for themselves in film. Tykwer has directed a number of films since this one, his most recent being the movie currently in theaters, Perfume: The Story of a Murderer, as well as Ich Dich Auch, also in 2006.

Lola Rennt, or Run Lola Run, is a film simply about a girl's (Lola) attempts to obtain $100,000 in twenty minutes to save her boyfriend (Manni) from death by a mobster boss if the money is not obtained in that time. The process of trying to obtain the money is repeated three times, each time showing how the different actions on Lola's part play out both in the future lives, and the immediate circumstances, of those she encounters.

Professor Stewart showed this film today in the Basic Philosophical Questions (BPQ) course for which I am currently teaching assisting. Needless to say it generated some good discussion, especially about the spiritual significance and symbolism of the "third attempt" and the comparison of the three attempts to discover the (many times very subtle) interconnections. Check it out!

Body & Soul: Toward Abolishing the Literal Paradigm and Resurrecting the Symbol

2006-11-07T21:27:00.000-05:00

Max Scheler once wrote, "There never was and is not now a "Christian philosophy," unless one understands by this an essentially Greek philosophy with Christian ornamentation" ("Liebe und Erkenntnis" ("Love and Knowledge") Gesammelte Werke 6).

Perhaps this quite provocative statement can also be applied to a so-called "Christian anthropology," for it is nothing more than a Greek anthropology with Christian embellishments. Namely, a Greek body-soul paradigm defined as “rational animal” conveniently adorned by "imago Dei."

But I suppose I should give some evidence for my near blasphemous remarks. I am not necessarily criticizing the body-soul paradigm itself, but only its literalized form seemingly to have arisen from the demythologizing tendency in Aristotle (which was inherited for the most part by the Thomistic tradition) and the radicalizing of that demythologization, by Descartes. The former having literalized the symbol once expressed by Platonic tradition (which was inherited for the most part by the early Church Fathers) and the latter having separated this literalized paradigm into a dualism. This literalization has obscured the awareness of how the Greek anthropological paradigm of body and soul arose from an archaic myth, that of Orphism, and how St. Paul and the early Christians adopted this anthropological paradigm under its thoroughly symbolic form. The direct result of this literalization, then, is the unfortunate, but ever common conception that the "body," or to use the Pauline terminology, "flesh," is literally the locus of evil.

This argument, more or less, is one advanced by Paul Ricoeur in, The Symbolism of Evil. His insight is astonishing! Yet so calmly clarified, as if it were common knowledge. In fact, it is a treasure tucked away toward the end of his work; but an excellent observation I think so many today, especially Christians, could benefit from. There are two elements to his argument which reveal the current misunderstanding of this ancient anthropological paradigm and its relation to Christianity.

The first I have only implied above, which is that this conception of a human person as constitutive of body and soul was not inherited by the first Christians from their Jewish tradition or background, and therefore, neither from their Scriptures, i.e., from the Genesis story of creation, which Ricoeur calls the "Adamic Myth." Rather, the anthropology of the Adamic myth is essentially "monistic," whereby, there is no distinction between two elements in man: a body and a soul. Indeed, Ricoeur, in his chapter on the Orphic myth of the "exiled soul," states:

None of the other myths [which includes the Adamic myth] is a myth of the 'soul'; even when they speak of a rupture in the condition of the human being, they never divide man into two realities. ... [Indeed], no myth is fundamentally less 'psychic' than the Biblical myth of the fall. It is, of course, and anthropological myth, and even the anthropological myth par excellence, the only one, perhaps, that expressly makes man the origin (or the co-origin) of evil; but it is not in any degree a myth of the adventures of the 'soul' considered as a separate entity. On the contrary, it is a myth of the 'flesh,' of the undivided existence of man(SOE, 280-81).

If this rupture was never indicated by the Biblical myth of the fall, how then do we explain the rupture of the human person, the tension which arose between the body and soul, with the loss of "original justice," that the Catechism of the Catholic Church tells us was a consequence of the fall.

The harmony in which they had found themselves, thanks to original justice, is now destroyed: the control of the soul's spiritual faculties over the body is shattered, the union of man and woman becomes subject to tensions.... Harmony with creation is broken.... Death makes its entrance into human history"(CCC, 400).

Strange, is it not? The last three of the four ruptures are specifically indicated in the Genesis account and are cited in the passage accordingly, but the first is not specified nor cited! So where did this dualistic paradigm of body and soul come from? Why so much emphasis on the body-soul paradigm if it never was explicit in Scripture, whereas the symbol of the "image of God," in fact was made explicit, but which has become, to a large extent, the subordinate aspect?

The answer in obvious: from Greek philosophy. But this is still not quite accurate, for the paradigm originated in what Ricoeur calls "the myth of the exiled soul," i.e., the ancient myth of Orpheus, where the body (soma) is identified with a prison (sema). The soul then, while in the body, is in a state of exile, and man is composed of two elements: an evil element which is the body, and a divine element, the soul.

So, these ideas which are commonly attributed to either Plato or gnosticism actually have their origins before both.

Now, Plato cannot be interpreted as holding to Orphic dualism, in the strict sense, even though he used this dualistic paradigm in his writings. The meanings are obscured now due to a literalization of the paradigm that would entice such a reading, but the reason that Plato is not a dualist in the Orphic sense, which is the same reason the early Christians are not who adopted this paradigm, is because both properly understood the symbolism of the body! And this is Ricoeur's second point: the literal 'body' or 'flesh' is not the place of evil nor an evil thing, but 'body' is only a symbol for an element of evil in the soul itself, viz., "the seat of everything that happens to me without my doing"(SOE, 332). Body only symbolizes an involuntary element in the soul itself, and thus gives us an understanding that evil is something that the soul inflicts upon itself as opposed to that which the body inflicts upon the soul. This is clear in Plato's Phaedrus with the metaphor of the Charioteer, upon which I adopted for the title of my blog. See my post, "'The Charioteer': Source, Meaning and Significance."

Ricoeur himself, of course, puts it best:

... for the body itself is not only the literal body, so to speak, but also a symbolic body. It is the seat of everything that happens in me without my doing (SOE, 332).

... the Pauline concept of the 'flesh' and the 'body' designates not a substantial reality, but an existential category, which not only covers the whole field of passions, but includes the moralizing will that boasts in the law. It is the alienated self as a whole, in opposition to the 'desires of the Spirit,' which constitute the inward man (SOE, 333).

The explanation of evil by the body is not an objective explanation, but an etiological myth; that is to say, it is ultimately a symbol of the second degree. But if that explanation aims at becoming scientific, as in modern times, then the ethical character of evil action disappears; man cannot impute evil to himself and at the same time refer it to the body, without treating treating the body as a symbol of certain aspects of the experience of evil that he confesses. The symbolic transmutation of the body is a necessary condition for its belonging the mythics of evil (SOE, 336; my emphasis).

Ricoeur finally asserts that this anthropological paradigm of body and soul can be seen as compatible with the Adamic myth of the fall only if the symbol is properly and duly recognized. In other words, only when the body-soul paradigm is seen in its symbolic (and not literalized) form, can it be compatible with Scripture.

However, it seems that the kind of paradigm held today, in our neo-Thomistic, post-Cartesian atmosphere of the Church and modern world respectively, in light, also, of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment in our recent western history, has moved away from this kind of symbolic understanding. So to put it bluntly, yes, I am saying I think our current so-called "Christian anthropology" is not a Christian anthropology at all, for it is not compatible with the creation story of Genesis. Though, at the same time, I am affirming that those elements of the New Testament, in St. Paul's writings, have sufficiently retained the symbol and are therefore in no way incompatible with the Old Testament.

In light of all this, Max Scheler's statement cited above holds great truth.

Conference: The Phenomenology of John Paul II

2006-11-07T20:42:00.000-05:00

While the positive impact that John Paul II had upon the contemporary world was extensive and will have lasting importance, an often neglected aspect that grounded and inspired his many contributions was his philosophical background.

Influenced by neo-scholastic philosophy and Thomistic theology, he also embraced the merits of phenomenology, writing his second dissertation on the ethical thought of Max Scheler who was a student of Edmund Husserl [This actually is inaccurate, Scheler was not a student of Husserl], the founder of phenomenology. A later philosophical synthesis, The Acting Person, expands upon the focus of his dissertation and shows a deep familiarity with Dutch phenomenological psychologists.

What bearing did phenomenology have upon Karol Wojtyla, the philosopher, and John Paul II, in his role as leader of the teaching church? Paper and Panel Presentations as well as keynote addresses by Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., Jean Bethke Elshtain and George Weigel will address this question.

This two-day conference on the phenomenology of John Paul II will be held at Duquesne University on Friday, Dec. 1 and Saturday, Dec. 2, 2006.

John Paul II’s play, The Jeweler’s Shop, will be performed nightly by Duquesne University students. Its exposition of love and commitment is deepened by a phenomenological appreciation of human experience.

The conference is free and open to the public, but seating is limited. The program is available on the website. Registration/reservations are required. For reservations and more information, contact Dr. Daniel Martino, phenomenology@duq.edu or register online.

Scheler vs. Heidegger, Part III: The Ontological Structure of 'World'--'Being-In' and 'Being-Toward'

2006-11-02T22:03:00.000-05:00

The last post (Part II) has indeed generated fruitful dialogue, but the content of that dialogue has not made me change the course of my initial trajectory in this comparison of the thought of these two great German phenomenologists. Dominic has argued that the question is misposed, and by its specific framing, there is "no way Scheler can come out on top" since we may have implied (we have in now way 'proposed') we go "hunting for Heidegger's Dasein in Scheler's account." But what is the question exactly? It is, yet again, as John White proposed: Whether "a human being's 'Being-in-the-world' is better characterized morally and practically as 'Being-toward-value'." This is my question; it is in no way framed insufficiently, for we are not yet granting Dasein's relation to the world is the measure by which we are judging Scheler's ontology, but we are asking which relation better characterizes a human one, and harmonizes most with human experience.

But there are still many more steps we need to take in this regard, because, whereas a priority for Heidegger is precisely to explicate and establish this relation explicitly through his description of the unified phenomenon of being-in-the-world, Scheler's is not as explicit. So, indeed, this takes some searching to fill in what White might mean by 'Being-toward-value,' noted after his delineation of Scheler's philosophy of love. Therefore, we are searching, not at all for Dasein in Scheler, but only Scheler's own conception of this unified relation toward 'world.'

For this end, I will move from the anthropological problematic of Part II, to a discussion of Heidegger and Scheler's conceptions of human beings relation to the world, precisely in the ontological structure of 'world,' laying emphasis on the element Heidegger described as "in-ness." Having laid this foundation, we will both raze to ruins Heidegger's criticism of Scheler's anthropology by revealing Heidegger's inherently shallow description of it in §47, and simultaneously lay the framework by which we can understand how Scheler's system of material values (with there lack in Heidegger) and the personal being's relation to them serves as the final death blow, viz., the characteristic that shows the superiority of Scheler's ontology.

In his chapter, "The Essence of Spirit," in Man's Place in Nature, Scheler magnificently describes the essential difference between animal and man as the difference between environment and world and the relation of the respective being to each. The animal can never separate itself from its environment, i.e., can never recognize things as objects. That which is most characteristic of man, however, transcends life and "leads back to the ultimate Ground of Being." This element is called spirit.

The first important characteristic is that spirit transcends environment, which enables man to relate to things as objects, counting himself as something very different: spirit is never an object, but lives dynamically in its acts. The spiritual being is "'free from the environment'", that is, '"open to the world.'" Such a being therefore is correlative with 'world.' However, this by no means indicates a kind of static conception of a single and 'self-given' world, or in the sense of a subject-object dichotomy, but he is simply establishing first a kind of "fundamental ontology" if you will: A spiritual person is fundamentally constituted by a "world-openness." "Man, then, is a being that can exhibit, to an unlimited degree, behavior with is open to the world. To become human is to aquire this openness to the world by virtue of spirit"(39). Furthermore, "man as a spiritual being is a being that surpasses himself in the world. As such he is also capable of irony and humor which always indicate the transcendence of actual existence (Dasein)"(46-7). In a sense, then, spirit--not the spiritual being constituted as a whole, but its "center"--is outside space and time.

Did I not say, however, that I would lay emphasis on the "in-ness" of this relation between person and world? Indeed, but this claim of transcendence is important for two reasons: first because in relation to Heidegger, this is very new, for Heidegger exerts his entire energy on this "in-ness," and not enough, I think, on any transcendent element. And secondly, because it is this transcendent element, coupled with the "in-ness" where Scheler is most powerful, for he breaks the tradition of thinkers who typically end up on one side or the other. Cf. Idealismus-Realismus.

Again, Heidegger's project largely concerns the "Being together with" the world. "Being-in" means not the bare, being in something, but the relation which two beings have in their common being in space. Dasein's being-in, "in the sense of being absorbed in the world" is elaborated by experience of throwness and angst, and ultimately will be the ground for historicity. Due to this, Heidegger rightly notices how things in the world are not just an agglomerate of independent objects, but are beings in unique relation and reference to Dasein, and are seen primarily, in their everydayness, in terms of their meaning and function for Dasein. I will admit there is strength in this analysis, and as we shall see it entails a concept of world very similar to, if not taken over from, Scheler's account. But it is largely one sided. Even in relation to the question of the Being of beings, and the meaning of being as such, a fundamental ontology need not only rests on this intimate relation. Rather, human beings are also characterized, and thus more completely characterized, by an element of transcendence from Dasein, meant (in Scheler's context) in the sense of "being-there"--"actual existence." For does not Heidegger even presuppose such a transcendence--that we can make things as objects for ourselves--in his very phenomenology? If he did not, Dasein would be nothing more than an animal inexorably bound to, and therefore unable to detach from, its environment! Thus Scheler shows that the constitution of Dasein must mean more than simply "being-in-the-world," i.e., "being absorbed in the world," so not to incur the inevitable fate of objectless animality. Where does one draw the dividing line? If Dasein is that for which being is an issue, this already entails a type of transcendence, but a transcendence lost a midst Dasein's "being-in" or "being together with the world." Or should we say, being together with the environment? A human being is rather better characterized by "being-toward," which reveals Scheler's emphasis on person as "being that can exhibit, to an unlimited degree, behavior with is open to the world."

But Scheler, even in emphasizing a transcendent element of spirit, is by no means an idealist: the spiritual person is still vastly different from Kant’s subject as transcendental apperception. We simply have to have recourse to Scheler’s earlier Formalismus it find an answer, in the section: “Person and World” (F 393-6). The world is always “the correlate of the person,” and so he is never a ‘part’ of a world. Every world is only “the world of a person.” Here he discounts all attempts to establish that there is only one single world, one “regarded as ‘self-given’ and ‘absolute,’ [but its] singularity and sameness are only an illusion.” Why is this the case? It is so because the person experiences the world in terms of different sets of meanings and value structures that arise from ones experiences of the world and the ‘cogiven’ idea of God and his macrocosmic world. Thus, like Heidegger, the world for an individual person is not simply a set of objects with static ‘natures’ but are things imbued with meaning and function—with value. This is why one can experience many things in a given life, but only a small number of those things actually mean anything to him, i.e., actually arise out of neutrality and, thus are meaningful.

These elements are very similar in Scheler and Heidegger, but we have yet much work to do, because this notion of world is as yet, for Scheler, in a very undeveloped form for the very crux of his conception has not yet been met, for a full understanding of meaning in the world inextricably follows upon Scheler’s very precise philosophy of material values, and the person’s exact relation to those values, and therefore relation to world, cannot be understood without first understand his notion of love! These are absolutely key in Scheler’s theory of ontology to the extent that what I said here in elaborating Scheler’s position should not be taken by any means, complete, but still largely undeveloped. For what we have yet to do is enter the realm of ethics—for what could be called Scheler’s fundamental ontology is first and foremost an ethical one, for the person, imbued with value, and relating by love-toward-value, is fundamentally constituted by an ethos. And it upon entering the realm of ethics that we precisely leave Heidegger in the dust.

In other words, what I have sought to do here in this post is to go no further than “being-toward” and to discover how it relates to “being-in.” It is the element of transcendence that is included in the former and not the latter that places “being-toward” as a better way of characterizing ontology.

What we have left to do is uncover the "being-toward-VALUE, which will prove to be no small and easy task, but will, again, constitute the proverbial death blow to Heidegger who remains only on the bare level of 'world,' or perhaps Dasein is simply and only an animal in its environment.