Intentenality in Early German Phenomenology
Richard Rorty, in one of his essays on Heidegger, viz., "Heidegger, contingency, and pragmatism," quotes a passage from Mark Okrent's book, Heidegger's Pragmatism that sparked my attention:
A comparison between Husserl and Heidegger is not as interesting to me as noticing how their phenomenological contemporary, Max Scheler, factors in. For his fundamental form of intentionality is not primarily cognitive nor practical, but rather, affective.
This may not mean much to the Husserlian nor the Heideggerian, but to the Schelerian, this is quite significant, primarily because of a simple point of Scheler's anthropology: "Man, before he is an ens cogitans [in this case, Husserl] or an ens volens [here, Heidegger], is an ens amans"(Selected Philosophical Essays, "Ordo Amoris," p. 110-11). Now, even if Scheler is right here, which I think he is, this fact alone does not guarantee Scheler's notion of intentionality all the more encapsulating, although it certainly raises the question. What would guarantee Scheler's affective notion of intentionality prime of place is if it can demonstrated to be more fundamental to, and encapsulating of, Husserl's and Heidegger's notions, as a correlative to Scheler's anthropology. If this can be demonstrated, it would serve also as a support of precisely this anthropological aspect.
I will certainly not attempt to spell all of this out in a blog post, which could be the topic of a long paper, but I will attempt to give hints here on how this can be done.
Concerning Husserl. He is always in the back of Scheler's mind, and no doubt is the source of much of Scheler's phenomenology. However, Husserl intellectual focus is certainly under Scheler's suspicious gaze. To narrow intentionality only to the cognitive realm would call Scheler's whole philosophy into question. Rather, I think that Husserl, too, could benefit greatly from a concept of intentionality in the realm of emotion. And I am thinking mostly of Husserl's Analyses of Passive and Active Synthesis (his lectures on transcendental logic) which attempt to uncover just why it is we choose one thing rather than another. This, I argue, cannot be done on the level of a theory of cognition, for logic only deals with neutrality.
Heidegger has much to learn from Scheler, and in fact already has. But he certainly did not take Scheler far enough into his philosophy. The only thing that comes close to what Scheler means by spiritual feeling is what Heidegger refers to as "mood" or "attestation." But these fail simply because if there is one part of our consciousness which is not intentional, I would certainly say mood. The cause of mood is always mediately there, and not immediately. That is, we always have to think back in past experiences or events as to why I feel some way; furthermore, mood seems to be much more of a "state" than an act. Whereas, Scheler's intentional feelings are "spontaneous acts" which are never "in something" or "about something," but loving and hating something!
Husserl conceives of the fundamental form of intentionality as cognitive; Heidegger conceives of it as practical. As a result, Husserl thinks of the horizons in which beings are placed before us for our intuitive apprehension, whereas Heidegger thinks these horizons as fields of activity.
A comparison between Husserl and Heidegger is not as interesting to me as noticing how their phenomenological contemporary, Max Scheler, factors in. For his fundamental form of intentionality is not primarily cognitive nor practical, but rather, affective.
This may not mean much to the Husserlian nor the Heideggerian, but to the Schelerian, this is quite significant, primarily because of a simple point of Scheler's anthropology: "Man, before he is an ens cogitans [in this case, Husserl] or an ens volens [here, Heidegger], is an ens amans"(Selected Philosophical Essays, "Ordo Amoris," p. 110-11). Now, even if Scheler is right here, which I think he is, this fact alone does not guarantee Scheler's notion of intentionality all the more encapsulating, although it certainly raises the question. What would guarantee Scheler's affective notion of intentionality prime of place is if it can demonstrated to be more fundamental to, and encapsulating of, Husserl's and Heidegger's notions, as a correlative to Scheler's anthropology. If this can be demonstrated, it would serve also as a support of precisely this anthropological aspect.
I will certainly not attempt to spell all of this out in a blog post, which could be the topic of a long paper, but I will attempt to give hints here on how this can be done.
Concerning Husserl. He is always in the back of Scheler's mind, and no doubt is the source of much of Scheler's phenomenology. However, Husserl intellectual focus is certainly under Scheler's suspicious gaze. To narrow intentionality only to the cognitive realm would call Scheler's whole philosophy into question. Rather, I think that Husserl, too, could benefit greatly from a concept of intentionality in the realm of emotion. And I am thinking mostly of Husserl's Analyses of Passive and Active Synthesis (his lectures on transcendental logic) which attempt to uncover just why it is we choose one thing rather than another. This, I argue, cannot be done on the level of a theory of cognition, for logic only deals with neutrality.
Heidegger has much to learn from Scheler, and in fact already has. But he certainly did not take Scheler far enough into his philosophy. The only thing that comes close to what Scheler means by spiritual feeling is what Heidegger refers to as "mood" or "attestation." But these fail simply because if there is one part of our consciousness which is not intentional, I would certainly say mood. The cause of mood is always mediately there, and not immediately. That is, we always have to think back in past experiences or events as to why I feel some way; furthermore, mood seems to be much more of a "state" than an act. Whereas, Scheler's intentional feelings are "spontaneous acts" which are never "in something" or "about something," but loving and hating something!
posted by Eric | 6:38 PM
3 Comments:
Let us begin with the central claim:
"What would guarantee Scheler's affective notion of intentionality prim[acy] of place is if it can [be] demonstrated to be more fundamental to, and encapsulating of, Husserl's and Heidegger's notions, as a correlative to Scheler's anthropology."
This--Scheler's primacy of place--I am afraid, is impossible, except perhaps in a historical sense. That is, Heidegger's account is transcendental, accounting for the grounds of the possibility of being simply, i.e. "fundamental ontology." As such, it is also accounting for the grounds for the possibility of intentionality. The problem may be simply that Scheler's account is anthropological, which is, to use the Husserial term, a "regional ontology," and thereby self-limiting. Scheler's account, to the extent that it is anthropological, cannot, for that very reason, be more "fundamental." The transcendental will always trump on depth and comprehensiveness because its focus is depth (ground) and comprehensiveness (possibility).
However, if the question is merely a matter of chronology, then, yes, of course, Scheler may have been the first to hit upon the "affective side" of intentionality. But I do not think that this was Eric's primary concern.
Let us now address the more specific claim that Heidegger's account of 'mood' "fails."
First, it is unclear exactly how Eric is claiming that mood "fails." He seems to suggest that it fails (1) to be a spiritual feeling and (2) that it fails to be intentional.
As regards (1), whether mood is a spiritual feeling or not is not only inconsequential to the central claim, viz. Scheler's primacy of place, but risks undercutting it. The very distinction between spiritual feelings and non-spiritual feelings betrays a partite anthropology that assumes, but cannot ground, a prior unity. Heidegger, as he is concerned with grounds, employs mood insofar as it is disclosive of this prior unity that makes possible Scheler's distinction as a distinction.
It may turn out that the prior unity of man is spiritual, such that Dasein's moods and the person's spiritual feelings may be identified. But this just all the more emphasizes the necessary primacy of the prior unity which alone would make such an identification possible.
As regards (2), whether mood is "intentional" will, of course, turn on our defintion of "intentional." If to be intentional is to be (a) a consciousness focusing on an object, then no, mood is not intentional. However, if by "intentional," we mean merely (b) any directedness towards, which includes bearing or disposition (Verhaltenheit), then yes, mood is intentional. (And it is what mood is directed toward/away from that is interesting.)
However, even if we choose meaning (a)--in which case mood is not intentional, even then--mood does not "fail" because it is the ground for, or disclosive of the ground for, the possibility of (a).
Now, as regards (2), viz. that mood "fails" to be intentional, Eric offers two arguments:
(i): "The cause of mood is always mediately there, and not immediately. That is, we always have to think back in past experiences or events as to why I feel some way ... "
(ii): " ... furthermore, mood seems to be much more of a 'state' than an act."
I will address (ii) first, since it is simpler to deal with. First, the difference between state and act here seems to fall along the same lines as the difference between (a) and (b). If this is the case, then it has already been addressed.
However, even if that is not the case, I would argue that the distinction does not apply. Dasein's being is as much a state as an act, and vice versa.
Mood discloses bearing, and thereby a being-toward. In Aristotelian terms, we might characterize this bearing, or disposition, as either a "second potentiality" or a "first actuality."
Aristotle gives us a concrete example of this in his De anima. The agent intellect is analogous to light, which he explicitly calls both a hexis, or state, and an energeia, or actuality, viz. the act of the transparent medium as transperent.
This is also true of Aquinas' account of God. Since God is not changing, he seems to be a state. However, this 'state' is that of 'pure act.'
In short, the account (logos) of Dasein's being 'occurs' (ereignet) in a space (d.h. die Offenheit) that is prior to and the ground for the possibility of these 'metaphysical' distinctions, e.g. state and act.
As regards (ii), viz. that "the cause of mood is always mediately there ..." I believe there is either (c) an equivocation on the word "cause" that displaces the whole discourse outside the realm of phenomenology, or (d) the implicit claim that it is love/hate that mediates mood, which love/hate would then be prior: in contrast to moods, "Scheler's intentional feelings ... are ... loving and hating ...".
As regards (c), the descriptor "mediately there" is ambiguous. On the one hand, the cause of mood is mediately there insofar as any cause qua cause is present 'through' its effect, e.g. mood, qua effect. On the other hand, the mood is mediately there insofar as it, as an effect, is, eo ipso, conditioned, or 'mediated,' by its cause.
However, these considerations seem inconsequential to the claim that they are supposed to support, viz. that mood is not intentional. To be intentional, does mood's cause have to be there immediately? What is it to be there immediately? And what is a cause here?
First, I gather from Eric's self-exposition--"That is, we always have to think back in past experiences or events ..."--that being in the past is a case of mediacy and, therefore, by "immediately," Eric means co-present. Therefore, the question is now whether the 'cause' of mood is co-present with mood.
Now, the very introduction of the word "cause" endangers the ability of a phenomenology to be insightful, putting it on a metaphysical plane that tends to obscure/flee from the here & now. This case would seem to be safeguarded from this danger because of the counter-balancing search for the immediate as co-present. However, the 'cause' posited for mood is not the 'cause' of mood. And this will show how thinking causally-metaphysically has covered up that which mood discloses, i.e. its 'cause.'
What mood discloses is the possibility-to-be that I have given myself over to being. In Sickness unto Death, Kierkagaard uses despair in order to show how we are attached not so much to actualities (whether these actualities be only potentially or actually), but to possibilities (which may be neither potential nor actual):
"A young girl despairs of love, that is, she despairs over the loss of her beloved, over his death or his unfaithfulness to her. This is not declared despair; no, she despairs over herself. This self of hers ... becomes a torment to her if it has to be a self without 'him.'" (I.A.C, p20)
Now, the 'cause' of the mood of despair is that my possibility-to-be, to which I am beholden (or to which I hold myself, or which I am), loses all actuality and potential and is 'reduced' to 'mere' possibility of impossibility. The young girl is still beholden to the possibility to be with her beloved, which is now 'impossible.' That is, she herself, qua being with her beloved, is 'impossible.' In otherwords, her existence is impossible.
The 'cause' that is co-present with the mood of despair is the 'impossibility' of my existence.
Eric wanted to place the cause of mood wholly within some past event, e.g. the death or unfaithfulness of a beloved. While a past event may certainly contribute to the occasion of a given mood, it contributes only insofar as it is involved with the present impossibility of my Existenz, i.e. of my being this possible self.
To sum up (c), the 'cause' of mood is not there mediately, but is immediate or co-present (unless by 'cause' is meant merely a past event, in which case the account has ceased to be phenomenological).
Now the more likely claim that (d) love/hate mediate mood and that therefore love/hate is prior. (d) is certainly true in at least some cases. However, even if we limit ourselves to those cases in which (d) is true, what is love/hate? In what way is love/hate prior to mood?
Let us return to Kierkegaard's example, and ask: how does the despair come about? Out of love, the young girl has 'gone ahead' and 'prepared a room' in her self for her beloved. While this being-with remains possible, this 'room' is a 'room.' However, once impossible, the 'room' becomes a hole, a wound. And the pain of this wound is despair.
Here, love is prior to despair in that it 'shapes' the (possible) self. In fact, love opens a wound (albeit as a room) in the (possible) self.
Now we begin to approach the question.
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