Intentenality in Early German Phenomenology

Richard Rorty, in one of his essays on Heidegger, viz., "Heidegger, contingency, and pragmatism," quotes a passage from Mark Okrent's book, Heidegger's Pragmatism that sparked my attention:

Husserl conceives of the fundamental form of intentionality as cognitive; Heidegger conceives of it as practical. As a result, Husserl thinks of the horizons in which beings are placed before us for our intuitive apprehension, whereas Heidegger thinks these horizons as fields of activity.

A comparison between Husserl and Heidegger is not as interesting to me as noticing how their phenomenological contemporary, Max Scheler, factors in. For his fundamental form of intentionality is not primarily cognitive nor practical, but rather, affective.

This may not mean much to the Husserlian nor the Heideggerian, but to the Schelerian, this is quite significant, primarily because of a simple point of Scheler's anthropology: "Man, before he is an ens cogitans [in this case, Husserl] or an ens volens [here, Heidegger], is an ens amans"(Selected Philosophical Essays, "Ordo Amoris," p. 110-11). Now, even if Scheler is right here, which I think he is, this fact alone does not guarantee Scheler's notion of intentionality all the more encapsulating, although it certainly raises the question. What would guarantee Scheler's affective notion of intentionality prime of place is if it can demonstrated to be more fundamental to, and encapsulating of, Husserl's and Heidegger's notions, as a correlative to Scheler's anthropology. If this can be demonstrated, it would serve also as a support of precisely this anthropological aspect.

I will certainly not attempt to spell all of this out in a blog post, which could be the topic of a long paper, but I will attempt to give hints here on how this can be done.

Concerning Husserl. He is always in the back of Scheler's mind, and no doubt is the source of much of Scheler's phenomenology. However, Husserl intellectual focus is certainly under Scheler's suspicious gaze. To narrow intentionality only to the cognitive realm would call Scheler's whole philosophy into question. Rather, I think that Husserl, too, could benefit greatly from a concept of intentionality in the realm of emotion. And I am thinking mostly of Husserl's Analyses of Passive and Active Synthesis (his lectures on transcendental logic) which attempt to uncover just why it is we choose one thing rather than another. This, I argue, cannot be done on the level of a theory of cognition, for logic only deals with neutrality.

Heidegger has much to learn from Scheler, and in fact already has. But he certainly did not take Scheler far enough into his philosophy. The only thing that comes close to what Scheler means by spiritual feeling is what Heidegger refers to as "mood" or "attestation." But these fail simply because if there is one part of our consciousness which is not intentional, I would certainly say mood. The cause of mood is always mediately there, and not immediately. That is, we always have to think back in past experiences or events as to why I feel some way; furthermore, mood seems to be much more of a "state" than an act. Whereas, Scheler's intentional feelings are "spontaneous acts" which are never "in something" or "about something," but loving and hating something!